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SUITS BETWEEN STATES IN THE SUPREME COURT
WILLIAM S. BARNES*

James Brown Scott, the eminent authority on international law,
published in 1919 a collection of the seventy controversies between
states which had been settled by the Supreme Court of the United
States.' His purpose in analyzing these cases was to point out by
analogy the possibilities for the new World Court 2 in the settlement
of international disputes by peaceful means. During that period many
other writers emphasized the value of the experience of our federal
jurisdiction in this regard.3
"The powers of the Supreme Court to settle disputes between states,
taken up reluctantly and with extreme caution, have kept pace with
the development of national power, have broadened in their scope

and become more elastic with the years, and without necessity to
use force or even hint at it except in the rarest cases, have become
an example to the nations of the constructive possibilities of reason
in a world of ever-recurring controversies and disputes. There are
few more significant developments in the history of modern jurisprudence." 4

During the thirty-five years since this was written, over fifty more
cases have come before the Court, and another war has caused renewed
efforts in the quest for a method of maintaining peace. Yet the reestablishment of an international court of justice has not been
heralded with the same enthusiasm, though the analogy has been
repeated.
A study of contemporary procedure and jurisdiction of the Supreme Court is a prerequisite of any plans for the expansion of the
business of the World Court in the future. The present emphasis on
international organization may lead to new legal problems in much
the same manner as the growth of federal power has done in this
country in the last quarter-century.
This paper will discuss only those cases in which an opinion was
* Secretary, International Legal Studies, Harvard Law School.
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rendered, omitting the admittedly significant memorandum reports
for lack of space. Due to the complicated and detailed nature of
many of the decrees, analysis of the substantive law of these interstate controversies is confined to a review of general principles.6
The history of controversies "between two or more states" goes
back to colonial days, when nine cases were referred to the Privy
Council of England. "These early settlements were evidently not in
any sense international arbitrations, but had all the paternal character of administrative determinations, both in their nature and
results.' 7 Under the Articles of Confederation, provision was made
for a court to determine the controversy, the litigant state naming
the persons from whom the judges would be drawn by lot, with
power in Congress to do so if the state neglected to name them.
The judges were to proceed to judgment even if the defendant state
refused to appear, making it the "first judicial tribunal with compulsory jurisdiction over sovereign states."8 It is interesting to note
that the Constitutional Convention considered leaving jurisdiction
and boundary disputes to the Senate, but it is reported that unanimity
prevailed in adopting the Virginia proposal for compulsory jurisdiction in the Supreme Court." Of the three ways of settling disputes
(force, agreement, and judicial decision) the first two were prohibited by the Constitution, except by consent of Congress. Nevertheless, it was fifty years before any important disputes were decided
by the Court, and those involved only boundary questions. The early
litigation was experimental in many respects and provides us with
a perfect example of the delicacy of the judicial process.'0 The states
were suspicious of the effectiveness of the Court in view of the fact
that there was no body of law applicable to states, but this objection
was overcome in the course of a lengthy series of cases between
"
6. U.S. CONST. Art. III, § 2:
"The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising
under this Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and Treaties made,
or which shall be made, under their Authority; to all Cases affecting Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls; to all Cases of admiralty and
maritime Jurisdiction; to controversies to which the United States shall be a
party; to Controversies between 'two or more States; between Citizens of
different States; between Citizens of the same State claiming Lands under
Grants of different States, and between a State, or the Citizens thereof, and
foreign States, Citizens or Subjects. [Italics supplied).
"In all Cases affecting Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls,
and those in which a State shall be Party, the supreme Court shall have
original Jurisdiction. In all the other Cases before mentioned, the supreme
Court shall have appellate Jurisdiction, both as to Law and Fact, with such
Exceptions, and under such Regulations as the Congress shall make."
7. Caldwell, supra note 4, at 41.
8. WARREN, TuE SUPREME COURT AND SOVEREIGN STATES 5 (1924).
9. Warren, The Supreme Court and Disputes between States, 103 WORLD
AFFAmS 197, 200 n. 6 (1940).
10. New York v. Connecticut, 4 Dall. 1, 1 L. Ed. 715 (U.S. 1799); New
Jersey v. New York, 6 Pet. 323, 8 L. Ed. 414 (U.S. 1832).
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Rhode Island and Massachusetts." It would only be repetitious to
summarize the rest of the cases, which are adequately covered by
Dr. Scott, but most of the established principles are based on those
precedents.
Before taking up the recent cases, some mention should be made
of other federal systems. The most highly developed is the Swiss
Federation, where disputes between cantons have been within the
jurisdiction of the Federal Court since 1874;12 it "is bound to decide
every cantonal dispute submitted to it" and applies both federal
and international law. "A canton may represent the private interests
of its citizens if it alleges incidentally an interest of its own," but
most of the cases have been in the capacity of a private juridical
person. 3 In Canada, there have been only five cases between provinces, the first being in 1886. Recently the Privy Council has denied
its jurisdiction over such appeals 1 4 and it may mean that all future
cases will be settled by arbitration. There has only been one case in
Australia 5 and it was decided "on grounds almost exactly similar to
the earliest controversies between American states."'16 Apart from
Switzerland, the United States is the only country which has successfully developed its federal jurisdiction to include suits between states.
In analyzing the experience of the last twenty-seven years, certain
conclusions are inescapable. Judicial settlement of interstate disputes
is only an incidental by-product of the development of federal rights
in individuals. Th analogy to the World Court is weak in that the
Supreme Court jurisdiction would not function without the federal
system of justice between individuals. The meaning of "justiciable
controversy" is constantly expanded by the Court, and the ad hoc
quality of each case has encouraged litigation. The appointment of
a Special Master in water rights cases has resulted in a new administrative function for the Court. The Court is making new law which
could not be administered if the Court did not have jurisdiction over
individuals.
The development of controversies between states since 1919 has
indicated that increasing attention is being given to the potentialities
of the original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court. The principal considerations have been jurisdictional and procedural rather than substantive. For example, the most recent cases involving new disputes
between states have been handled on motion or by reference to a
11. The final decision is found in 4 How. 591, 11 L. Ed. 1116 (U.S. 1846).

12. Swiss FEDERAL CONSTITUTION OF 1874, Arts. 5, 110, 113.
13. Schindler, The Administration of Justice in the Swiss Federal Court
in IntercantonalDisputes, 15 Am.J.INT'L L. 149, 155, 159 (1921).

14. A.G. of Ontario v. A.G. of Canada, [1953] 1 All E.R. 137 (P.C.).
15. South Australia v. Victoria, 18 Commonwealth L.R. 115 (1914).
16. Caldwell, The Settlement of Interstate Disputes, 14 Am.J.INT'L L. 38,
52 (1920).
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Special Master. The older suits which have involved boundaries
and water rights have come back on the docket for modification of
the substantive decree, in one instance 17 to conform to an agreement
between the parties, and in another' s to take account of the changed
situation resulting from the construction of dams.
During the last thirty-five years, the tremendous development
of irrigation, flood control, and hydro-electric power has resulted
in many disputes over water rights, which have given a new function
to the Supreme Court. The balance of interests involved in an equitable division between states requires delicacy and an infinite capacity
for detail. Although there are still some boundary disputes, the years
of litigation since the first decision of such a suit between states 9 has
been marked by a tendency for the Court to rely on the appointment
of Special Masters. It is interesting to note that the interstate business
of the Swiss federal court is parallel to our own as to boundary
disputes and water rights, the only major difference being in the
field of double taxation where the Swiss court has always held it to
be inadmissible, and since 1874 it has been outlawed by the Con20
stitution.
The facts presented to the Supreme Court in the various cases
between states are discussed below in some detail in order to suggest
the atmosphere in which the procedural problems of original jurisdiction are posed. They fall into three broad categories: boundary
disputes, interstate water rights, and prevention of injury to a state
by the action of another state.
(1) Boundary Disputes
In a suit to determine the boundary along the Mississippi River,
the facts showed that in 1848 a bend in the river was straightened
by a sudden shift in the channel, which shift left an island on the
Mississippi side.21 Although no agreement had been made by the
parties, the boundary of Arkansas on admission to the Union was
declared to be the main channel, whereas that of the defendant was
"on the river and up the same." Mississippi contended that it should
be equally distant from the two banks, a solution which would give
her half of the new island. The Court held that the line was fixed at
the middle of the channel of navigation as it existed before the
17. Kansas v. Missouri, 340 U.S. 859, 71 Sup. Ct. 86, 95 L. Ed. 628 (1950).

18. Nebraska v. Wyoming, 345 U.S. 981, 73 Sup. Ct. 1041, 97 L. Ed. 1394
(1953).
19. Rhode Island v. Massachusetts, 4 How. 591, 11 L. Ed. 1116 (U.S. 1846).

20. Schindler, The Administration of Justice in the Swiss Federal Court in
Intercantonal Disputes. 15 Am. J. INTL L. 149, 165 (1921). See also Swiss
CONST. Art. 46(2).
21. Arkansas v. Mississippi, 250 U.S. 39, 39 Sup. Ct. 422, 63 L. Ed. 832
(1919).
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sudden change in the course of the river, the controlling consideration
being equality of access to navigation. A commission of three men was
appointed to ascertain the exact line. The Court did not give any
weight to the decision of the Mississippi courts which had given
individuals rights to the middle of the island. The doctrine of the
"thalweg," as it is called in international law, is not absolute. Where
the avulsion has moved the navigable channel, the boundary remains
in the old channel.
"Equality in the beneficial use often would be defeated.., by fixing
a given line merely because it connects points of
the boundary 'on
22
greatest depth.
Another exception to the doctrine of "thalweg" is carved out where
there is no navigable channel. On the basis of the Treaty of 1787,
Georgia contended that the line in the Savannah River and its upper
reaches was midway between banks, and that where there were
islands, it was in the middle of the northerly branch. The line was
important in regard to taxation rights over dams and electric plants.
South Carolina claimed to the low-water mark on the Georgia bank.
and held that
The decision was an interpretation of the Convention 23
Georgia was entitled to half the river and the islands.
The next case of a boundary concerning the middle of the river
channel involved the difficult problem of determining where the current ran in 1850, over seventy-five years earlier. The evidence, for
what it was worth, seemed to indicate that the river had been all over
the Rio Grande Valley during that period but was substantially as
alleged in the cross-bill during the crucial year.2 4 The witnesses presented conflicting testimony and the master's findings were accepted
as "substantially correct." This case points out the weakness of a
reference back to a particular date in the practical problem of proof.
Another aspect of the doctrine is brought out by the case of Louisiana v. Mississippi 25 where the master found that changes in the course
of the river were by erosion and accretion prior to 1913 but in that
year there was an avulsive change. It is strange that so much should
depend on the subtle distinction between a gradual and a sudden

change in the flow of the river, especially where it depends on doubtful testimony.

The most recent case in this category concerned the boundary at
22. Minnesota v. Wisconsin, 252 U.S. 273, 282, 40 Sup. Ct. 313, 64 L. Ed.
558 (1919).
23. Georgia v. South Carolina, 257 U.S. 516, 42 Sup. Ct. 173, 66 L. Ed.
347 (1922).
24. New Mexico v. Texas, 275 U.S. 279, 48 Sup. Ct. 126, 72 L. Ed. 280,
modified, 276 U.S. 558 (1927).
25. 282 U.S. 458, 51 Sup. Ct. 197, 75 L. Ed. 459 (1931).
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Forbes Bend in the Missouri River.26 Kansas relied on accretions between 1900 and 1917 to establish her right to a large island shaped like
a horseshoe, and when the channel on her side of the island became
predominant, she claimed it was an avulsion and that she therefore
still owned the island. The Court held that Kansas failed to sustain
the burden of proof that the main channel ever flowed on the Missouri
side. The States were agreed on the law as to accretions and avulsions,
so the case was based on the development of testimony, making an
issue of fact which was really decided by the findings which the
master made.
The rule that the boundary shall be the middle of the channel of
strongest current had disadvantages and raised doubts:
"Even so, there has emerged out of the flux of an era of transition a
working principle of division adapted to the needs of the international
community.... The line of division is to be the center of the main
channel unless the physical conditions are of such a nature that a
27
channel is unknown."

Old chapters, laws, agreements and treaties have supplied a starting
point for judicial reasoning in some of these cases. Vermont v. New
Hampshire28 was decided in 1933 on the theory that the order-incouncil placing the colonial boundary on the top of the west bank
of the Connecticut River was nullified by the successful Revolution,
and that Vermont had been admitted to the Union as an independent
state with self-constituted boundaries. As a result of the terms of
the state charter, the line was found to be at the low-water mark on
the Vermont side, and exceptions by New Hampshire were overruled
on the ground that she had not asserted dominion over the west bank,
and Vermont had need for access to the water. It is hard to state any
general rule as to the importance of colonial boundaries and conveyances in view of these two cases, but great weight is usually given to
the original limits of territory unless it is expressly changed.
The two elements of most of these border problems which make
them unpredictable are the influence of treaties or other agreements
and the ripening of a prescriptive right based on long continued dominion over a strip of land. Both factors played a part in the Red River
case,29 making it unique in river boundary litigation. One of the
grounds on which Texas established her right to the flood plains
south of the water was the fact that she had exercised jurisdiction
26. Kansas v. Missouri, 322 U.S. 213, 654, 64 Sup. Ct. 975, 88 L. Ed. 1234
(1944).
27. New Jersey v. Delaware, 291 U.S. 361, 383, 54 Sup. Ct. 407, 78 L. Ed.

847 (1934).
28. 289 U.S. 593, 53 Sup. Ct. 708, 77 L. Ed. 1392 (1933).
29. Oklahoma v. Texas, 272 U.S. 21, 47 Sup. Ct. 9, 71 L. Ed. 145 (1926).
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over the area around Big Bend for fifty years. Of course, title by
prescription can only be acquired if the state acquiesces in the assertion of sovereignty. 30 Failure to exercise dominion coupled with
acquiescence in the other state so doing was one basis of the decision
in Vermont v. New Hampshire.3 1
Although there was language in the leading case of Rhode Island v.
Massachusetts to the effect that the rule of limitations should not be
applied in disputes between two political communities "who cannot
act with the same promptness as individuals," it is no longer "equally
evident that a possession so obtained ... cannot give a title of prescription." 32 This is borne out by the case which involved a dispute
between Michigan and Wisconsin over islands in the Green Bay section.3 3 There was a voluminous record of eighty years' history, setting
forth the fact that Wisconsin had always been in possession of the
disputed area, collecting taxes, holding elections and enforcing its
laws there. The Court held that the doctrine of adverse possession
34
applied not only to individuals but to sovereign states as well.
The Court has recently held that even the rule of "thalweg" does
8
not preclude the right of a state to acquire land by prescription.
This doctrine of prescriptive right to territory may provide a new
approach to boundary questions, giving some flexibility to rules which
were based on historical considerations no longer significant. As a
matter of fact, the division of the surface of the earth into states is
only justified by the exigencies of political administration, and should
be based on the practical convenience of separate jurisdictions rather
than time-worn concepts of sovereignty. The tremendous increase
in the powers of the federal government and the development of
communication have conspired to reduce the importance of boundary
questions, as can be seen by the way in which these suits were
handled. It has come to be little more than a technical academic
question save in exceptional cases, and the Court has been shifting
its emphasis to a different type of interstate controversy.
(2) Interstate Water Rights
During the last century, there have been ten separate controversies
30. Louisiana v. Mississippi, 282 U.S. 458, 51 Sup. Ct. 197, 75 L. Ed. 459
(1931), and New Jersey v. Delaware, 291 U.S. 361, 54 Sup. Ct. 407, 78 L. Ed.
847 (1934) denied prescriptive claims on this ground.
31. 289 U.S. 593, 53 Sup. Ct. 708, 77 L. Ed. 1392 (1933).

32. 15 Pet. 233, 272-73, 10 L. Ed. 721 (U.S. 1841).

33. Michigan v. Wisconsin, 270 U.S. 295, 46 Sup. Ct. 290, 70 L. Ed. 595 (1925).

34. As to territorial jurisdiction in respect to fishing, the Court said that
"equality
of right can best be attained by a division of the area as nearly
equal as conveniently may be made having regard to matters heretofore
litigated." Wisconsin v. Michigan, 295 U.S. 455, 462, 55 Sup. Ct. 786, 79
L. Ed. 1541 (1935).
35. Arkansas v. Tennessee, 310 U.S. 563, 60 Sup. Ct. 1026, 84 L. Ed. 1362

(1940).
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before the Supreme Court over water rights in interstate streams.
Nine of these, involving twenty-one different opinions, have come up
in the last thirty-five years. There have been over a hundred memorandum decisions 36 issued by the Court in connection with thdse
disputes, to say nothing of the countless volumes of testimony which
have been taken.
The original suit of Kansas v. Colorado3 7 involved the use of the
Arkansas River; the first phase of the suit established the jurisdiction
of the Court and the last phase dismissed the bill without prejudice to
the right of Kansas to bring another suit if the equitable apportionment of benefits should be destroyed in the future. The important
point of the case was that in a situation where the States operated on
different rules as to water rights, 38 the benefits of the river could be
equitably divided by the Court whenever either state was injured by
the diversion of water by the other. Kansas was not entitled to the
whole flow, as in the state of nature, nor could Colorado be justified in
cutting her off by disposing of all the waters within her borders.
As a consequence of the dismissal of the suit, Colorado improved
her irrigation system to the point that certain private suits had been
brought to enjoin the upstream users. Colorado brought suit for an
injunction against these private suits asserting that a proper settlement can only be made in litigation between the two states. Kansas
answered that the increase in Colorado use had enjoined the downstream users and asked for an injunction against further diversion
until its rights were satisfied. The case went to a Special Master who
reported that the private suits ought to be enjoined, that Kansas had
been injured and that an allocation in acre feet should be made giving
5/6 to Colorado and 1/6 to Kansas. The court allowed the injunction,
but dismissed the states on the ground that there was no substantial
injury to Kansas and the case is "not to be determined as if it were one
between two private riparian appropriators" allotting fractions to
39

each.

This case represents the only time in which two states having
divergent water law principles attempted to get an apportionment
in the Supreme Court, and it is important to note that no relief was
given. This conclusion seems to have resulted from the absence of
any controlling legal basis for determining respective rights:
36. One case was decided without opinion by memorandum confirmation
of the master's report. Texas v. New Mexico, 308 U.S. 503, 510, 60 Sup. Ct.
63, 84 L. Ed. 435 (1939); 344 U.S. 906, 73 Sup. Ct. 326, 97 L. Ed. 699 (1953).
37. 185 U.S. 125, 22 Sup. Ct. 552, '46 L. Ed. 838 (1902) (opinion by Chief
Justice Fuller), 206 U.S. 46, 27 Sup. Ct. 655, 51 L. Ed. 956 (1907) (opinion
by Justice Brewer).
38. Kansas applied the common law rule of riparian rights whereas Colorado
adhered to the doctrine of priority of appropriation.
39. Colorado v. Kansas, 320 U.S. 383, 393, 64 Sup. Ct. 176, 88 L. Ed. 116 (1943).
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in respect of riparian rights that happen to be effective for
the time being in both states do not necessarily constitute 4a dependable guide or just basis for the decision of a controversy.1 0

-"Laws

very important case' 1 was filed by Arizona as a result of the
Boulder Canyon Project authorizing the Secretary of the Interior to
build, a dam and hydro-electric plant for the purpose of improving
navigation and flood control as well as reclamation and electric power.
The complainant state alleged an invasion of its quasi-sovereign rights
by diverting water and an attempt to enforce the terms of the Colorado River Compact which it never ratified. The Court upheld the
action of the United States as an exercise of the power over navigation, without deciding whether it had any power over irrigation.
Of the four controversies yet to be discussed, three follow a fairly
definite pattern which obviously represents a departure from the
earlier approach without specifically overruling any of the above
mentioned decisions. Mr. Justice Holmes paved the way in 1931 in
42
the apparently innocuous settlement of New Jersey v. New York.
This was a suit to enjoin the diversion of the tributaries of the Neversink and Delaware Rivers by New York to provide a new water supply
for New York City. New Jersey insisted on the strict application of
the common law rule of riparian rights alleging interference with
navigation and injury to the oyster industry in Delaware Bay and to
the use of the river for recreational purposes. The latter basis was
held to be valid and an injunction was granted against diversion in
excess of 440 million gallons per day.
The only exception to the earlier cases was that of Wyoming v.
Colorado, finally decided in 1939, but filed in 1911. The case was reargued three times before the Supreme Court because of "the novelty
and importance of some of the questions involved."' 3 The suit joined
two corporate defendants who were diverting water from the Laramie
River under the authority and permission of Colorado. The complainant state sought an injunction on two grounds; that water cannot
lawfully be diverted from the watershed and that it had made appropriations prior to those which Colorado was asserting. The first
ground was held to be untenable as was the answer of the defendant
that it had a right to dispose of the water "regardless of any prejudice
it may work." The other grounds of defense were that under an
equitable division, she was not exceeding her share and that there was
40. Connecticut v. Massachusetts, 282 U.S. 660, 670, 51 Sup. Ct. 286, 75 L.
Ed. 602 (1931).
41. Arizona v. California and the Secretary of the Interior, 283 U.S. 423,
51 Sup. Ct. 522, 75 L. Ed. 1154 (1931).
42. New Jersey v. New York, 283 U.S. 336, 51 Sup. Ct. 478, 75 L. Ed. 1104
(1931).

43. Wyoming v. Colorado, 259 U.S. 419, 42 Sup. Ct. 552, 66 L. Ed. 999 (1922).
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enough water left for the needs of Wyoming after she had made the
division complained of. The first thing which Mr. Justice VanDevanter did in the opinion was to distinguish the case of Kansas v.
Colorado, because here both states recognized the same system. As
the United States was not trying to impose a policy of its own, what
basis was to determine the respective rights of the parties? The combined demand for water was in excess of the dependable flow, a fact
44
which never fails to generate action on the part of the court.
The long history of this case illustrates the difficulties in which the
Court may become enmeshed by assuming the role of distributor when
there is not enough to go around.
Undaunted by this experience, the Court has recently undertaken
an even more complicated job of "equitable apportionment" of water
rights among states. The facts were presented to a Special Master
and the case came back on exceptions to his report.45 The case involves allegedly wrongful diversions of the North Platte which is a
non-navigable river. Since 1930, drought conditions have prevailed
and as a result, the Pathfinder Reservoir in Nebraska has never been
full although water for it was appropriated in 1913. Wyoming completed the Kendrick Project in 1940, and there can be no water in
that reservoir without violating the Nebraska priority. This is another
case where the dependable natural flow has long been over-appropriated, but the situation is serious because Nebraska is totally dependent
on water from Wyoming and Colorado. As Mr. Justice Douglas points
out in the opinion, "the dry cycle has precipitated a clash of interests
which between sovereign powers could be traditionally settled only
by diplomacy of war."4 6 The complications in this case develop out
of the system of dams and canals which makes for an interstate scope
of water distribution without interstate administration. Nevertheless,
the opinion states that the situation is "not basically different from
that where two or more persons claim the right to the same parcel of
land. '4 7 The decision really goes one step further than any previous
decrees in apportioning the natural flow according to an allocation
submitted by the Master which in the critical section of the river
establishes a flat 25%-75% ratio. Recognizing that a genuine controversy exists, the opinion states the reasons for this particular
action as follows:
44. See Texas v. Florida, 306 U.S. 398, 59 Sup. Ct. 563, 83 L. Ed. 817 (1939),
where the aggregate tax demand exceeded the amount of the estate, and
compare Massachusetts v. Missouri, 308 U.S. 1, 60 Sup. Ct. 39, 84 L. Ed. 3
(1939), where it did not.
45. Nebraska v. Wyoming, 325 U.S. 589, 65 Sup. Ct. 1332, 89 L. Ed. 1815
(1944).
46. Id. at 608
47. Id. at 610
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if an allocation between appropriation States is to be just and

equitable, strict adherence to the priority rule may not be possible
...there is evidence that a river-wide
priority system would disturb
' 48
and disrupt long established uses.

The total impact of these three cases can not be overemphasized
especially in view of what was said by Mr. Justice Brandeis in his
dissent in Pennsylvaniav.West Virginia to the effect that jurisdiction
should be denied because the court was unable to grant the only relief
appropriate. 49 Yet such a determination of how to divide benefits
between states has been involved in these water rights cases and the
Court has not declined to hear them. It is clear that a change has taken
place in the ideas about the function of the Court, but it is not yet
clear how revolutionary a step has been taken.
No better example of this tendency can be found than the litigation
over the Chicago Sewage Canal which lasted fifteen years and involved eleven states.50 The bill sought an injunction to prevent Illinois and the Sanitary District of Chicago from permanently diverting water from Lake Michigan. The case was referred to Charles E.
Hughes as Special Master, and he reported that the bill presented a
'justiciable controversy' and that it was within the power of Congress
to regulate the diversion. A diversion of 4,000 cubic feet per second
was permitted and the Sanitary District was enjoined from diverting
any more than that amount. The decree issued in the first case of the
series not only ordered a reduction of the diversion to the point where
it rests on a legal basis, but also required Illinois to put in some other
means of sewage disposal. The case was referred back to the Master
to find out about practical measures which would have to be taken
to dispose of the sewage without any unlawful diversions. The next
decree was framed on the second report which recommended a
gradual reduction in the amount which could be lawfully diverted
while building storm works and a sewage plant at the same time.5 1
Later the decree was enlarged to require completion of the plants and
a report on progress. It was hinted that "the Court did not exhaust
its power by the provisions enjoining diversion of water. 5 2 When
48. Id. at 618.

49. Pennsylvania v. West Virginia, 262 U.S. 553, 43 Sup. Ct. 658, 67 L. Ed.
1117 (1923).
50. Wisconsin v. Illinois, 278 U.S. 367, 49 Sup. Ct. 163, 73 L. Ed. 426 (1929).

The other complainants were Michigan, Minnesota, New York, Ohio and
Pennsylvania. A motion to dismiss brought by Kentucky, Missouri, Tennessee and Louisiana as intervenors was denied in 270 U.S. 634 (1925). The
earlier history of this project includes Missouri v. Illinois, 180 U.S. 208 (1901),
200 U.S. 496 (1906); United States v. Sanitary Dist. of Chicago, 266 U.S.
405 (1924).

51. 281 U.S. 179, 696 (1930) (6500 cub. ft. per second till the end of 1935,
then 5000 c.f.s. till the whole system is completed in 1938).
52. 289 U.S. 395, 406, 53 Sup. Ct. 671, 77 L. Ed. 1283 (1933).
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Illinois petitioned for a temporary modification allowing diversion
until 1942, the court issued a per curiam decision to have a special
master investigate the facts as "no adequate excuse has been presented for the delay. '53 As a result, an agreement was suggested and
the Great Lakes states accomodated Illinois to the extent of allowing
a limited increase in the diversion for 10 days to flush out the canal.54
The entire history of this litigation shows a reluctance on the part of
the Court to use harsh measures against a state, depending more on
the force of repetition and firmness to bring about obedience in time.
One could almost say that the Court regretted its acceptance of the
Master's recommendation to specify the exact manner and time in
which each step was to be carried out and would have preferred to
avoid the supervision of compliance. The difficulty lay in the fact
that the wrongful diversion of lake water could only be stopped by
providing some other means of disposing of the sewage, but in view
of the fact that no showing of injury or nuisance due to the sewage
was made, the Court could have left this problem to the state.
Prevention of Injury
Among the controversies in which one state seeks to prevent injury
by another, Pennsylvania v. West Virginia55 stands out for its influence on constitutional law. It is one of the few cases in which the
merits of the claim for relief depended upon a specific clause in the
Constitution, in this case, the exclusive power of Congress over interstate commerce. The West Virginia legislature passed a law requiring public service companies to fill the needs of inhabitants of the
state before sending any natural gas outside its border. Before the
first World War, West Virginia produced more gas than she needed
and many pipe lines were run into surrounding states with a continuous flow of gas from the point of production to the point of use.
The complainants alleged that over five million people in their states
depend on this supply to cook and heat and the states use it in charitable and penal institutions, schoolhouses and city waterworks. They
claimed that enforcement of the new law would cause irreparable injury, costing every user at least $100 to change over to other kinds of
fuel. The court enjoined the enforcement of the statute on the ground
that it directly interfered with interstate commerce, and could not be
sustained as a legitimate measure of conservation in the interest of the
people when it really amounted to an embargo. The only other case of
53. 309 U.S. 569, 571, 60 Sup. Ct. 789, 84 L. Ed. 953 (1940).
54. 311 U.S. 107, 61 Sup. Ct. 154, 85 L. Ed. 73 (1940). Exceptions to the final
report were overruled per curiam, 313 U.S. 547, 61 Sup. Ct. 1090, 85 L. Ed.
1513 (1941).
55. 262 U. S. 553, 43 Sup. Ct. 658, 67 L. Ed. 1117 (1923).
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this kind, Louisiana v. Texas,5 6 where the suit was dismissed because
there was no injury to the state as such but only to her citizens, was
distinguished by the majority on the ground that here the state had
a proprietary interest of its own. As far as the concept of a "justiciable controversy" is concerned, this case was the razor's edge on which
two lines of decision were precariously balanced. The majority
opinion seems to have put the old doctrine to rest although the ghost
still walks among the minority. The Court answered all the arguments of the defendants as follows: the suit was not premature because the injury was "certainly impending" even though damage had
not yet resulted; the pipe line companies were not essential parties,
because they were adequately represented by the defendant state.
This case not only allowed the complainant state to sue in behalf of
its citizens to a greater extent than ever before, but it also liberalized
some of the rules as to indispensable parties, allowing a state to be
sued as representative of the real or active defendants. 7 Mr. Justice
Holmes dissented on the merits of an analogy to the regulation of
game, colored oleomargarine and spirits, which had not yet begun to
move in interstate commerce, whereas McReynolds and Brandeis
denied the jurisdiction of the Court altogether. Perhaps their best
point was that "the vindication of the freedom of interstate commerce
is not committed to any state as "parens patriae." Mr. Justice Brandeis
goes into the 'legislative facts' in great detail, and concludes that it
is an attempt to enjoin legislation, without any danger of an invasion
of rights, and therefore not a 'controversy' within the meaning of the
federal Constitution. The reference to public consumption of natural
gas is a mere "make-weight" and there can be no injury to the Pennsylvania users until the twelve exporting companies cut off their
service.
Although suits have been entertained for the collection of stateowned bonds5 s and the execution of a contract to pay a debt,59 the
first specific performance of a contract was granted only 24 years
ago. 60 The highway commissions of the two states agreed to build a
bridge across the Ohio River at Evansville. Citizens of Indiana sued
in their state courts to enjoin the construction on the ground that the
contract was invalid under state law. Indiana admitting that its officers had authority and that the contract was valid, delayed per56. 176 U.S. 1, 20 Sup. Ct. 251, 44 L. Ed. 347 (1900). For an excellent analysis
of the case, see SCOTT, JUDICIAL SETTLEMENT OF CONTROVERSIES BETVEEN STATES
OF THE AMERICAN UNION

334-44 (1919).

57. On this point, see also Wisconsin v. Illinois, 289 U.S. 395, 53 Sup. Ct.

671, 77 L. Ed. 1283 (1933).

58. South Dakota v. North Carolina, 192 U.S. 286, 24 Sup. Ct. 269, 48 L.
Ed. 448 (1904).
59. Virginia v. West Virginia, 246 U.S. 565, 38 Sup. Ct. 400, 62 L. Ed. 883
(1918).

60. Kentucky v. Indiana, 281 U.S. 163, 50 Sup. Ct. 275, 74 L. Ed. 784 (1930).
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formance of the contract until the suits were settled. The Court took
no action against the individual defendants apparently on the ground
that they could not hold up the ,construction merely by bringing suit
and that the state would have to obey the decree of specific performance.
"While this Court always examines with appropriate respect the
decisions of state courts bearing upon such questions, such decisions
do not detract from the responsibility of this court in reaching its
own conclusions as to the contract obligation and impairment ...
for otherwise the constitutional guaranty could not be properly
enforced."0 '

A similar fact situation was presented in the recent case involving
interference with contractual obligations. 62 The University of Arkansas, an official state instrumentality, had agreed to build a hospital
with funds to be provided by a private foundation organized under the
laws of Texas. Texas sought to enjoin this action on the ground that
Texas law required that the trust funds must be expended for the
benefit of Texas residents. Litigation was pending in the Texas courts
to determine the state law on this matter. The motion for an injunction against Texas has been continued until the litigation is concluded.
A vigorous dissent expressed the view that it is up to the state to decide and no purpose is served by the threat implicit in keeping the
case on the docket.
No review of the principles of interstate law would be complete
without going into the problem of double or multiple taxation. Two
cases in the same year point out the exact line between what is 'justicible' and what is not.63 The facts of the first case indicate that four
states (besides the federal Government) claimed the right to tax the
estate of Colonel E. H. R. Green on the basis of domicile at the time
of his death. 'Texas had only a weak claim but the case was referred
to a Special Master and his report that Massachusetts was the true
domicile was confirmed. Short of a complete renovation of the basis
of jurisdiction to tax, some adjudication of this problem was deemed
to be necessary because the taxes claimed were more than the net
estate and it could not be decided in any state court. It would seem
that this was just what the Supreme Court's original jurisdiction was
designed t6 accomplish.
It is disappointing to find that jurisdiction was denied where one
cannot collect its tax without going, into the other state just because
61. Id. at 176.
62. Arkansas v. Texas, 346 U.S. 368, 74 Sup. Ct. 109, 98 L. Ed. 71 (1953).
63. Texas v. Florida and Massachusetts, 306 U.S. 398, 59 Sup. Ct. 563, 83
L. Ed. 817 (1939); Massachusetts v., Missouri, 308 U.S. -1, 60 -Sup. -Ct. 39,
84 L. Ed. 3 (1939).
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there is enough to cover both claims. The Court suggested that
Massachusetts had an adequate remedy against the trustees in Missouri. The states had passed reciprocal laws to avoid such a situation
but nevertheless both states claimed the exclusive right to tax a trust
estate left by a domiciliary of Massachusetts with trustees who were
residents of Missouri. The argument of the complainant state, asking
for a decision as to which had the lawful right to impose the tax is
persuasive:
"If the evils of multiple taxation are to be solved by reciprocal
legislation of the States, as this court has suggested, it is essential
that there be a forum where recalcitrant states may be compelled
to observe the reciprocity their legislatures have provided." 64
The Court does not seem to have faced this argument squarely in the
opinion written by Chief Justice Hughes:
"Apart from the fact that there is no agreement or compact between
the states having constitutional sanction, enactment by Missouri of
so-called reciprocal legislation cannot be regarded as conferring upon
Massachusetts any contractual right."65
Before attempting to puzzle out the direction and scope of these
recent cases, we must examine the procedural aspects of the cases
already discussed and others which never got to the merits. There
is no sharp division between substance and procedure in this field because there is no reason for making it, but it may be useful to examine
the methods which the Supreme Court has used, outlining the various
steps through which the litigation must go.
Jurisdictionand Procedure
In the foregoing analysis of certain interstate disputes, one may
have noted the relation between the substantive result and the way
in which the Supreme Court approached the controversy. The problem
of acting in the capacity of a trial court in this respect is solved in
many different ways. -This unique branch of federal jurisdiction cannot be ignored if we are to discover the elements which make the
Court successful in doing a job which other countries have left to
arbitration or agreement. Of course, there is always the alternative of
interstate compacts but in many instances the states have tried such a
solution and failed; some other system by which disputes may be
settled peacefully is obviously necessary.
The original jurisdiction over cases between states is derived directly from the Constitution and cannot be enlarged or assigned either
by the Court or Congress. As Mr. Justice Brewer pointed out in
Kansas v. Colorado:
64. Massachusetts v. Missouri, 308 U.S. 1, 4, 60 Sup. Ct. 39, 84 L. Ed. 3 (1939).
65. Id. at 16.
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"through these successive disputes and decisions, this Court is practically building up what may not improperly be called interstate
common law.

66

The cornerstone of this body of law, the "linchpin of jurisdiction"
is provided by the right to sue a state without its consent. If a state
does not appear, it may be subpoenaed, and proceeded against ex
parte. The state may appear as parens patriae of a large body of
citizens but "the interests of the State as a political community must
be really involved." 67 The Court has always proceeded on principles
of equity in these cases, usually in a liberal spirit. "One important
phase of all these suits is to be particularly noted; the mere pendency
of the suit in the Court for long periods of time, is a great mollifier."6 s
69
An example of a typical case is that of Vermont v. New Hampshire,
filed in 1916 and finally closed 21 years later. It has been repeatedly
pointed out that this jurisdiction and procedure differs from that
which the Court pursues in suits between private parties, presumably
because of the dignity of the litigants and possibly because they involve "disputes which might properly be the subject of diplomatic
70
adjustment.
The suit is generally instituted by an application for leave to file
an original complaint against the named state or states, and a return
by the defendant to show cause why leave should not be granted. Four
recent cases were nipped in the bud when the court denied leave.
Alabama sought to enjoin Arizona and four other states from forbidding sale of convict-made goods and on a return that the suit was
multifarious and based on insufficient facts, the Court refused to allow
the bill.71 In the course of an opinion by Mr. Justice Butler, many
of the faults of the bill are brought out which we will have occasion
to discuss in another connection. Alabama failed to allege sufficient
injury, there being a greater burden on states to prove the absolute
necessity of the suit than on private parties.
In a later case, the Court refused to entertain a bill to perpetuate
testimony of those persons who arranged the Colorado River Compact, on the ground that Arizona was not a party to the Compact, and
therefore its meaning would never be material to the litigation.7 2 This
case came as a result of the dismissal of Arizona's bill without preju66. 206 U.S. 46, 98, 27 Sup. Ct. 655, 51 L. Ed. 956 (1907).

67. Caldwell, The Settlement of Interstate Disputes, 14 Am. J. INT'L L. 38,
64-65 (1920). For a recent discussion of this problem, see New Jersey v. New
York, 345 U.S. 369, 73 Sup. Ct. 689, 97 L. Ed. 1081 (1953).
68. Warren, The Supreme Court and Disputes between States, 103 WoBLD
ArFAms 197, 207 (1940).

69. 300 U.S. 636, 57 Sup. Ct. 429, 81 L. Ed. 853 (1937), supra p. 499.
70. Chief Justice Taft in North Dakota v. Minnesota, 263 U.S. 365, 374, 44

Sup. Ct. 138, 68 L. Ed. 342 (1923).

71. Alabama v. Arizona, 291 U.S. 286, 54 Sup. Ct. 399, 78 L. Ed. 798 (1934).
72. Arizona v. California, 292 U.S. 341, 54 Sup. Ct. 735, 78 L. Ed. 1298 (1934).
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dice in case stored water is used in such a way as to interfere with

perfected rights or the right of Arizona to make additional legal appropriations. Two years later, Arizona was again turned down, when
she sought the judicial apportionment of the waters of the Colorado
River, without alleging infringement of her appropriations. 78 This time
the Court went on the ground that the United States was an indispensable party (the stream was navigable) and had not consented to
be sued. In the opinion, Mr. Justice Stone said that contentions that
the United States cannot control water until commerce is actually
moving on the river cannot be judicially determined in a proceeding
to which the United States is not a party and in which it cannot be
heard, as the decree could have no finality.
Another case in which motion for leave to file a bill was denied is
Massachusetts v. Missouri, 74 involving the question of which state had
lawful right to impose a tax on intangible property in a trust estate.
The Court heard argument on both sides and Chief Justice Hughes
pointed out that "Missouri cannot be brought into court by the expedient of making its citizens, parties to a suit otherwise not maintainable against the state," as recourse to the protection of the State
is not necessary. He added that it would make far too much business
in the Supreme Court and suggested that Massachusetts sue the
trustees in the Missouri courts as the property there was sufficient
to satisfy both claims.
Another aspect of this opinion is the assertion that the controversy
is not 'justiciable', because the complainant is not asserting a right
susceptible of judicial enforcement. It is difficult to see how this suit
differs.in this respect from Texas v. Florida,75 decided earlier in the
same year, the only factual difference being that there was not enough
property to cover the taxes in the latter case. Nevertheless, the Court
seems to accept the argument of Missouri that "the constitutional
provision conferring jurisdiction is not mandatory" and that "suits
not justiciable before the Constitution are not made justiciable by the
Constitution. '76 But if this contention is really true then the classification of a particular subject as "political" or "non-justiciable" can
never be changed and the jurisdiction must remain stagnant. It also
means that the states are left with no way of deciding the controversy
as "none of the states will consent to become a party to any proceedings for determining the right to collect tax in any other state." 77
We have only to look at the majority opinion in Rhode Island v. Massachusetts to discover that a political question may become judicial,
73.
74.
75.
76.

Arizona v. California, 298 U.S. 558, 56 Sup. Ct. 848, 80 L. Ed. 1331 (1936).
308 U.S. 1, 60 Sup. Ct. 39, 84 L. Ed. 3 (1939).
306 U.S. 398, 59 Sup. Ct. 563, 83 L. Ed. 817 (1939).
308 U.S. 1, 10, 60 Sup. Ct. 39, 84 L. Ed. 3 (1919).

77. Texas v. Florida, 306 U.S. 398, 410, 59 Sup. Ct. 563, 83 L. Ed. 817 (1939).

1954]

SUITS BETWEEN STATES

although Chief Justice Taney dissented on the ground that the complaint for "sovereignty" and "dominion" should be dismissed as political.78 It would seem that the consent to be sued and the submission
to the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court would have made all interstate controversies "justiciable." As the inventor of the word himself
admits, "the establishment of this new branch of jurisdiction seemed
to be necessary from the extinguishment of diplomatic relations between states." 79 In other words, controversies or other relations between states are not excluded from the Court (made non-justiciable)
because they are political,V° but rather on other grounds which we
will not examine.
In order to be within the judicial power of the Supreme Court, it
must be a "controversy" within the words of Article III of the Constitution. With the exception of a few general remarks in some cases,"'
this problem narrows down to two points; (1) whether the suit is
somehow premature and (2) whether there is any actual or threatened
injury and invasion of rights. Both situations presuppose that the
state has a real interest in the subject matter of the dispute; in a long
line of decisions, a proprietary interest or a strong quasi-sovereign
capacity have been held to be sufficient, 2 but where individual suits
could remedy the situation, jurisdiction has been denied.8 3 During the
period in question, the right of a state to maintain suit has been
recognized when the "health, comfort and prosperity of the people of
the state and the value of their property are being gravely menaced."84
But the opinion in that case by Mr. Justice Clarke goes on to say:
Before this court can be moved to exercise its extraordinary power
under the Constitution to control the conduct of one state at the suit
of another, the threatened invasion of rights must be of a serious
magnitude5 and it must be established by clear and convincing
evidence.s
78.
79.
33 L.
80.

4 How. 591, 639, 11 L. Ed. 1116 (U.S. 1846).
Mr. Justice Bradley in Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 15, 10 Sup. Ct. 504,
Ed. 842 (1889).
Cf. Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 3 Pet. 1, 7 L. Ed. 581 (U.S. 1831);
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COURT AND POLrrICAL QUESTIONS (1936).

81. Texas v. Florida, 306 U.S. 398, 405, 59 Sup. Ct. 563, 83 L. Ed. 817 (1939);
Kentucky v. Indiana, 281 U.S. 163, 50 Sup. Ct. 275, 74 L. Ed. 784 (1930);

Pennsylvania v. West Virginia, 262 U.S. 553, 43 Sup. Ct. 658, 67 L. Ed. 1117
(1923); in all the cases the Court held that it had jurisdiction.
82. Georgia v. Pennsylvania R.R., 324 U.S. 439, 65 Sup. Ct. 716, 89 L. Ed.
1051 (1945); Georgia v. Tennessee Copper Co., 206 U.S. 230, 27 Sup. Ct. 618,
51 L. Ed. 1038 (1907); Missouri v. Illinois, 180 U.S. 208, 21 Sup. Ct. 331, 45
L. Ed. 497 (1901); Rhode Island v. Massachusetts, 12 Pet. 657, 9 L. Ed. 1233
(U.S. 1838).
83. Louisiana v. Bowles, 322 U.S. 707, 64 Sup. Ct. 1049, 88 L. Ed. 1551 (1943);
Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447, 43 Sup. Ct. 597, 67 L. Ed. 1078 (1923);
Oklahoma v. Atchison, T. and S.F. R.R., 220 U.S. 277, 31 Sup. Ct. 434, 55
L. Ed. 465 (1911).
84. New York v. New Jersey and Passaic Valley Sewerage Comm'n, 256
U.S. 296, 41 Sup. Ct. 492, 65 L. Ed. 937 (1921).
85. Id. at 309.
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The tunnel which New Jersey proposed to build emptying into New
York harbor did not amount to a definite threat of injury to New York
State but the dismissal of the bill was without prejudice to the right to
renew application if conditions should change in the future.
A similar ruling issued as to one paragraph of New York's bill
against Illinois to enjoin diversion of water from Lake Michigan on
the ground that there was a future possibility of interference with
future water power developments at Niagara; the motion to strike
86
the paragraph was sustained without prejudice. Another premature
suit was the one brought by Arizona against California and the Secretary of the Interior to enjoin the building of Boulder Dam on the
ground that it is an unlawful diversion of the water of the Colorado
River. It was dismissed on two grounds, the latter8 7being that there
is no present invasion of her quasi-sovereign rights.
Another group of cases does not leave the state free to litigate later
because the Court finds that the state has no right which could ever
be invaded.88 The recent modifications of the earlier decree in Nebraska v. Wyoming bear out the warning expressed by Mr. Justice
Roberts in his dissent:
"Without proof of actual damage in the past, or any threat of substantial damage in the future, the court now undertakes . . .to
supervise for all time the respective uses of an interstate stream
on the basis of past use.... Experience teaches the wisdom of the
rule we have so often announced, that in such cases, the complaining
state must show actual or immediately threatened damage, of subthat until
stantial magnitude to move the court to grant relief, and
89
such a showing is made, the court should not interfere."
Some cases have been referred to a Special Master and after a
hearing on the merits have been dismissed on various grounds.
"The fact that the Court, for reasons of policy or convenience, does
not exercise the power which it possesses and which has been traditionally exercised in like cases between private suitors, does not
a case or controversy cognizable
deprive the suit of its character as
by this Court in an original suit."90
In other words, jurisdiction may be retained even though the situation
does not warrant the relief sought by the complainant. Evidently the
exceptional case may "impose a risk of loss upon the state" which is
86. New York v. Illinois, 274 U.S. 488, 47 Sup. Ct. 661, 71 L. Ed. 1164 (1927).
87. Arizona v. California, 283 U.S. 423, 51 Sup. Ct. 522, 75 L. Ed. 1154 (1931).
88. Colorado v. Kansas, 320 U.S. 383, 64 Sup. Ct. 176, 88 L. Ed. 116 (1943);
Massachusetts v. New York, 271 U.S. 65, 46 Sup. Ct. 357, 70 L. Ed. 838 (1926).
89. Nebraska v. Wyoming, 325 U.S. 589, 657, 660, 664, 65 Sup. Ct. 1332, 89 L.
Ed. 1815 (1944), 345 U.S. 906, 73 Sup. Ct. 1041, 97 L. Ed. 1394 (1953).
90. Texas v. Florida, 306 U.S. 398, 412, 59 Sup. Ct. 563, 83 L. Ed. 817 (1939).
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sufficient to set in motion the adjudicating machinery even though
something less than an injunction is the end product. If this is what
the opinion means, it will expand the possibilities of states that wish
to get a decision as to their rights even before a "controversy" has
developed. We will have occasion to refer to this decision again
when we take up declaratory decisions of the Court.
Once jurisdiction attaches, the Court goes ahead to decide all the
incidental elements of the case. For example, it was necessary to appoint a receiver to hold the disputed flood plains in the heated boundary controversy on the Red River between Oklahoma and Texas.9 1
As a result, the United States claimed ownership of this land and the
southerly half of the bed of the stream (as the boundary was declared to be the south bank).
Claims to property of which the court has taken possession and controls through a receiver may be dealt with as ancillary to the suit
wherein possession is taken and control exercises-and this although
independent suits to enforce the claims could not be entertained in
that court.

After settling the ownership of flood plains, and river bed, the next
phase of the litigation involved the expenses of drilling oil wells
during the receivership, then the claims to royalty interests in proceeds held by the receiver, and finally the validity of surveys of
private tracts.
There is also some language in the opinion in Kentucky v. Indiana
(granting specific performance of a contract to build a bridge) that
indicates how far the incidental jurisdiction of the court extends:
The fact that the solution of these questions may involve the determination of the effect of local legislation of either state, as well as of
acts of Congress, said to authorize the contract, in no way affects the
duty of this court to act as the final, constitutional arbiter in deciding
questions properly presented ... neither can determine their rights
inter sese, and this Court must pass upon every question essential to
such determination.... 92

Although the Court follows the equity principle of dealing with all
phases of a dispute properly before it, the rule as to joinder of parties
is less liberal. In Alabama v. Arizona,93 a bill was refused because of
the fact that suit against any one of the five states joined would be
enough. However, the Chicago Sanitary District litigation seems to
91. Oklahoma v. Texas, 256 U.S. 70, 41 Sup. Ct. 420, 65 L. Ed. 831 (1921),
258 U.S. 574, 42 Sup. Ct. 406, 66 L. Ed. 771 (1922), 265 U.S. 505, 44 Sup. Ct.

604, 68 L. Ed. 1152 (1924), 268 U.S. 252, 45 Sup. Ct. 497, 69 L. Ed. 937 (1925).
92. Kentucky v. Indiana, 281 U.S. 163, 176, 177, 50 Sup. Ct. 275, 74 L. Ed.

784 (1930).

93. 291 U.S. 286, 54 Sup. Ct. 399, 78 L. Ed. 798 (1934).
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indicate that they are not so strict with complainants. 4 Several cases
have indicated that the individuals who would cause the injury need
not be joined because the state was an adequate representative of
their interests.9 5 This is a more liberal view of the doctrine as to indispensable parties than exists in the law applicable to suits between

private individuals.
Whenever a state attempts to bring suit on behalf of its citizens, it
may be barred by the 11th Amendment as in the case of North Dakota
claiming money damages.9 6 In the converse situation, where the state
tries to get at citizens of another state by suing that state, the cases
are not decisive.9 7 The rule would seem to depend on the circumstances of the particular case and the extent to which such a practice
is necessary to make an effective decision of the controversy.
The number of cases in which the United States has been allowed
to intervene has increased with the development of federal interests
throughout the country.9 8 Where each of four states claimed to be
the domicile of the deceased for inheritance tax purposes, the parties
were brought before the court in a suit in the nature of a bill of interpleader.9 9 This device proved effective where the net estate was
not sufficient to pay the aggregate amount of taxes claimed, but would
not seem to be necessary in view of the power of the Court to hear
controversies involving any number of states.
Once the Court has the subject matter and the parties before it,
the next step is the trial of the facts. Except in the case of Kentucky
v. Indianawhere there was an agreed statement of facts, the Court has
usually referred the case to a master to hear the facts and submit a
report. In twelve cases, involving all kinds of questions, the report
of the master was accepted by the Court substantially as presented.
In six cases, the losing state excepted to the report and in every case,
the exceptions were overruled. 100 In one case, both litigants excepted
94. Wisconsin joined with New York, Michigan, Minnesota, Ohio and

Pennyslvania in the suit against Illinois for diversion of water from the Great
Lakes, 278 U.S. 367, 49 Sup. Ct. 163, 73 L. Ed. 426 (1929). But cf. New Jersey
v. New York, 345 U.S. 369, 73 Sup. Ct. 689, 97 L. Ed. 1081 (1953).
95. Arkansas v. Texas, 346 U.S. 368, 74 Sup. Ct. 109, 98 L. Ed. 71 (1953);
Pennsylvania v. West Virginia, 262 U.S. 553, 43 Sup. Ct. 658, 67 L. Ed. 1117
(1923).
96. North Dakpta v. Minnesota, 263 U.S. 365, 44 Sup. Ct. 138, 68 L. Ed.
342 (1923).

97. Massachusetts v. Missouri, 308 U.S. 1, 18, 60 Sup. Ct. 39, 84 L. Ed. 3

(1939). Cf. Colorado v. Kansas, 320 U.S. 383, 64 Sup. Ct. 176, 88 L. Ed. 116
(1943).
98. New York v. New Jersey, 256 U.S. 296, 41 Sup. Ct. 492, 65 L. Ed. 937
(1921); Oklahoma v. Texas, 258 U.S. 574 42 Sup. Ct. 406, 66 L. Ed. 771 (1922);

Nebraska v. Wyoming, 325 U.S. 589, 65 Sup. Ct. 1332, 89 L. Ed. 1815 (1944).

99. Texas v. Florida, New York and Massachusetts, 306 U.S. 398, 59 Sup.
Ct. 563, 83 L. Ed. 817 (1939).

100. Wisconsin v. Illinois, 313 U.S. 547, 61 Sup. Ct. 1091 85 L. Ed. 1513

(1940); Washington v. Oregon, 297 U.S. 517, 56 Sup. Ct. 540, 80 L. Ed. 837
(1936); Wisconsin v. Michigan, 297 U.S. 547, 56 Sup. Ct. 584, 80 L. Ed. 856
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and the decree was modified slightly and one of the exceptions sustained.' 01 Most of these reports involve the apportionment of water
rights or the location of a boundary. Where further proof was needed,
in the early cases,'10 2 specific questions were set down for a rehearing,
whereas the more recent cases were merely referred back to the
master.1 3 The Court is coming to depend more and more on the
hearings before the master to bring out the intricate details of its
ever-expanding business.
When a boundary is established by decree of the Court, a commissioner is appointed to run it and establish the actual line by monuments. There are often many difficulties involved in designating the
line on the ground but absolute accuracy is not required so long as
there is a reasonable degree of certainty. 10 4 In establishing the boundary along the bank of the Red River, the commissioner had trouble
with the uneven, sometimes non-existent cut bank and resorted to a
gradient. Oklahoma protested but after a hearing, the court sustained
the way in which the commissioner had construed the decree. 0 5 Exceptions to the report of the commissioner have been overruled in
every boundary controversy to date.
If the case has not been settled in some stage of the foregoing procedure a decree will be issued on the merits. Even though the suit
has not been dismissed earlier in the proceeding, injunctive relief
may be denied on the ground that the complainant has not sustained
the burden of proving a threatened invasion of its rights. This burden
is "much greater than that generally required to be borne by one seeking an injunction in a suit between private parties."' 0 Where the
evidence resulted in a denial of injunctive relief; the opinion, stated
the situation as follows:
"The case comes down to this: the court is asked upon uncertain
evidence of prior right and still more uncertain evidence of damage,
to destroy possessory interests enjoyed without challenge for over
half a century." 01
The wisdom of granting injunctive relief is brought into question
(1936); Vermont v. New Hampshire, 289 U.S. 593, 53 Sup. Ct. 708, 77 L. Ed.
1392 (1933); Louisiana v. Mississippi, 282 U.S. 458, 51 Sup. Ct. 197, 75 L. Ed. 459
(1931); Wisconsin v. Illinois, 278 U.S. 367, 49 Sup. Ct. 163, 73 L. Ed. 426 (1929).

101. New Mexico v. Texas, 276 U.S. 558, 48 Sup. Ct. 344, 72 L. Ed. 699 (1927).
102. North Dakota v. Minnesota, 256 U.S. 222, 41 Sup. Ct. 626, 65 L. Ed. 899
(1921); New York v. New Jersey, 249 U.S. 202, 39 Sup. Ct. 261, 63 L. Ed. 560
(1919).
103. Wisconsin v. Michigan, 295 U.S. 455, 55 Sup. Ct. 786, 79 L. Ed. 1541
(1935); Wisconsin v. Illinois, 281 U.S. 179, 50 Sup. Ct. 266, 74 L. Ed. 799 (1930).

104. Arkansas v. Tennessee, 269 U.S. 152, 46 Sup. Ct. 31, 70 L. Ed. 206 (1925).
105. Oklahoma v. Texas, 265 U.S. 493, 44 Sup. Ct. 571, 68 L. Ed. 1118 (1924).
106. Connecticut v. Massachusetts, 282 U.S. 660, 51 Sup. Ct. 286, 75 L. Ed.
602 (1931).
107. Washington v. Oregon, 297 U.S. 517, 56 Sup. Ct. 540, 80 L. Ed. 837 (1936).
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when we examine the cases of Wyoming v. Coloradoand Wisconsin v.
Illinois. The original decrees in both controversies gave strong relief-in the latter, affirmatively requiring acts to be done to remedy
the situation. 08 The state did not disobey the order of the Court to
reduce the diversion of water from Lake Michigan but it delayed
action on the construction of sewage disposal plants so long that the
injunction really served to make matters worse. In the other case,
a bill to enforce the injunction was brought and the Court held that
Colorado could not avoid the decree by claiming that the unlawful
diversions are being made by individuals-not party to the earlier
suits.43 9 The only effective way to deal with recalcitrant states is to
proceed against the government official individually rather than contempt proceedings against the State as was suggested in a later phase
of Wyoming v. Colorado."0 As Warren points out:
"neither the authority of a superior office, if in violation of a law nor
the authority of a law if in violation of the Constitution will save a
man from liability ... Before we are required to fall back on the element of force for the execution of a Court's judgment against a state,
we have this element of individual liability.""'
In addition to the decree in the Chicago DrainageCanal case, there
is only one other case in which affirmative relief was granted and in
this instance it was evidently never brought into force because the
water was never diverted. The injunction against diverting in excess
of 440 million gallons per day was coupled with a decree that a plant
for the treatment of sewage be constructed. 11 2 It cannot be said that
the positive decrees of the Supreme Court have been enforced too
readily, yet the passage of time seems to remove the necessity of
drastic measures being taken and the Court has generally avoided a
show-down by framing its decrees in accordance with the difficulty
of enforcement.
Recently a new kind of remedy has been applied over the strong
objections of Justices Frankfurter and Black. Although it is not as
broad as an advisory opinion, it is difficult to fit into the category of a judgment. There are certain cases in Which irreparable injury may be prevented by a mere adjudication of rights
which is binding on the parties. In Nebraska v. Wyoming, a mathematical allocation of water rights is made by the Court. Difficult as
it is to separate the judicial from the administrative, this flexible
remedy has been heavily criticised by Mr. Justice Roberts:
108. Wisconsin v. Illinois, 289 U.S. 395, 53 Sup. Ct. 671, 77 L. Ed. 1283 (1933).
109. Wyoming v. Colorado, 286 U.S. 494, 52 Sup. Ct. 621, 76 L. Ed. 1245 (1932).
110. 309 U.S. 572, 60 Sup. Ct. 765, 84 L. Ed. 954 (1939).
111. WARREN, THE SuPREnv

COURT AND SOVEREIGN STATES 81 (1924).

112. New Jersey v. New York, 283 U.S. 336, 51 Sup. Ct. 478, 75 L. Ed. 1104

(1931).
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I doubt if in such interstate controversies, any state is ever entitled
to a declaratory judgment from this court-I am sure that on the

present record, none of the states is entitled to a declaration of
rights.113
In spite of the dissenters, the Court seems prepared to issue a declaration of rights whenever it is satisfied that a controversy exists, a compromise which may have been made to avoid the embarrassment of
unenforced decrees.
The costs in most of these controversies are divided equally between
the parties. There are cases in which the losing party has had to pay
all the costs.- 4 In the dispute between Massachusetts and New York,
the complainant was held to pay for the whole thing, presumably because of the spurious character of her claim. A more burdensome court
bill fell upon the protesting shoulders of the government of Illinois
at the close of her lengthy litigation with the Great Lakes states over
the unlawful draining of Lake Michigan. The Court is not opposed to
punishing litigious or recalcitrant states any more than individuals
although normally interstate suits are brought in good faith. The
mere threat or possibility of bringing the Court to the point of using
its enforcement machinery has served to limit the number of unwarranted claims.
It would seem that the Court has profited by its experience in some
fields, but still rushes into others with a reckless abandon. The suits
have been handled efficiently, but slowly, in order to allow time for
tempers to cool. The memorandum decisions indicate that most of the
references to special masters are general and their reports must be
invaluable as guides to the decisions of the Court. The oral argument
is usually limited to two hours but even that much time is not given
when a satisfactory report has been received from the master. It
should not be forgotten that litigation between states is only a tiny
part (1%) of the business of the Supreme Court.
These particular controversies which have been settled in the Supreme Court yield certain general principles. In the cases which involved the boundaries between states, there are three major factors
which have been considered. Starting with the doctrines of international law applicable to such disputes, the Court has decided each
case on a judicial interpretation of the original charter which defined
the extent of the state territory, conditioned by the evidence of longcontinued exercise of sovereignty over the disputed region. In other
words, legal precepts or rules, the history of -thestate, and the facts of
the particular situation have all been important bases of decision. In
113. Nebraska v. Wyoming, 325 U.S. 589, 657, 65 Sup. Ct. 1332, 89 L. Ed.
1815 (1944).
114. Missouri v. Illinois, 202 U.S. 598, 26 Sup. Ct. 713, 50 L. Ed. 1155 (1906);
Louisiana v. Mississippi, 202 U.S. 58, 26 Sup. Ct. 571, 50 L. Ed. 913 (1906).
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the field of water rights, the doctrines of equity and fair division of

benefits have been subordinate to the local law under which individual
users of the stream have established their rights. The state has been
considered as the champion of the aggregate claim of its citizens and
the convenience of this approach to the problem is recognized. This
emphasis on the importance of local rules keeps the Court from formulating any general principles. In the absence of such principles, selfordering is impossible and the Court is burdened with the necessity of
deciding each case ad hoc, which can only lead to an increase in
litigation. The next step will probably be central administration of
interstate water disputes by a federal agency. The only other alternative is a greater use of the compact approved by Congress,11 but
such a solution fails to take advantage of the existence of a federal
system. The problem of interpretation and enforcement of such compacts will still remain, at any event. It is significant that the question
of multiple taxation by states should have come up in the form of a
controversy before the Supreme Court. The absence of any constitutional provision on the subject may be the reason, and this fact may
give us a clue to the greater scope of the original jurisdiction over
states in the United States than in other federal systems.
With the exception of the natural gas embargo, there is no case
which we have discussed in which the Constitution provides the
principle upon which it is to be decided. It would seem that citizens
of the United States only turn to their state government for help
when they are unable to assert their rights under any provision of the
federal Constitution. In view of the fact that only one case out of a
hundred is between states, the Supreme Court naturally uses the same
machinery and the same basis of decision as it does in the other
ninety-nine. There is no magic in the idea of a state being party to
the suit when we look at the substance of the claim. In every case,
had the Constitution so provided, the controversy could have been
settled between the groups concerned. Even if there were no state
boundaries, disputes would arise which would involve the question
where one administrative jurisdiction left off and another began. The
idea of state sovereignty has fallen into disrepute in our federation to
such an extent that individuals no longer press their claims in the
name of their state but rather as individual citizens living in a certain
geographical territory. It is not strange that the methods which the
Court has found adequate for these individuals should prove equally
adaptable to states. The politically organized unit is no more of a
privileged character than the economically organized corporation.
115. For example, the decree in Kansas v. Missouri was recently modified
to conform to a subsequent agreement. 340 U.S. 859, 71 Sup. Ct. 86, 95 L.
Ed. 628 (1950).
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The limitations on the power of the Supreme Court in the exercise

.of this jurisdiction are the same as those which occasionally appear
in private suits; for example, the Dred Scott case did not settle the
controversy between slave states and free states over control of the
federal union. It has been asserted that the Court has failed as a
substitute for force, that it cannot compel a state to abide by its decree,110 yet if this criticism is valid, it does more than question the

jurisdiction in controversies "between two or more states." The Court
is enforcing decrees against the states every day under the Constitution, quite apart from their original jurisdiction docket.
When we examine the opinions of the Court in suits between states,
we cannot help but notice a difference approach from suits between
individuals. There is a greater burden on the state to prove its right
to have a judicial decree, which shows a desire on the part of the Court
to discourage this type of suit. Most of the differences between the
treatment of individual and state stem from this motive. The Supreme Court is not willing to take disputes that come up in interstate
form unless there is no other remedy.
The function of a judiciary is to administer justice according to law
all along the line and if justice can be obtained by individuals as such,
the court is not to be criticized for refusing to hear their claim under
the guise of a state suit.
The myth of state "sovereignty" has been dissolved by the growth
of the law as judicial and administrative process. Where the suit is
between individual and state, the state must act as judge in its own
cause. In the United States, we have achieved just results in such
cases by a strict separation of powers. But such a division of
"sovereignty" in the legal sense, whether local or national in character, presupposes the existence of a principle upon which a fair distribution of "sovereign" powers can be made. "The fundamental political belief of the people of the United States has always been that
there exists a supreme universal law governing the actions of
states."" 17 This faith lies at the root of the growing conception of a
constitutional law supreme over states, based on more than mere
agreement and acquiescence. The Supreme Court recognizes the integration of all law as its primary responsibility and therefore views
its jurisdiction as a single whole of which suits between states form
a very small part.
The unique design of our federal legal structure does not encourage
analogy to the International Court of Justice now sitting at the Hague.
116. Note, Original Jurisdiction of the United States Supreme Court, 39
HARV. L. REV. 1085, 1087 (1926).
117. Snow, The Development of American Doctrine of Jurisdiction of
Courts over States in JUDICIAL SETTLEMENT OF INTERNATIONAL DISPUTES No. 460
(1911).
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This World Court has no appellate jurisdiction, only states may be
parties, and its competence depends on the extent to which each state
voluntarily submits to it. There is no World Constitution, no system
or hierarchy of courts, and no world law. No doubt, what Caldwell
says of the old Privy Council is true of the World Court:t
The strength of a judiciary is no greater than that of the executive
and legislative departments on which it must necessarily depend....
In the world of larger states, there must be international government before any international court can really achieve the judicial
settlement of disputes.
Before we come to the practical problem of enforcement, there is a
more vital element. We have seen that the Supreme Court had little
time for suits between states, and settled them as by-products of a
greater legal order. Until a court has jurisdiction over the individuals
who compose the state and those who control its government, "judicial" settlement of such controversies is a misnomer. A court cannot
be successful if its power is limited to applying a segment of the
law. Judicial power must extend to every situation and provide
an opportunity to obtain justice at any stage of a controversy in
order to be effective in the ordering of world society.

